题目：The information role of critical audit matters in expanded audit report: Evidence from China Stock Market 2021-01-12 主讲人：尹兴强 博士 时间：2021年1月13日14:00开始 地点：管理学院324室 腾讯会议ID：678549903 欢迎大家参加！ 主讲人简介 尹兴强，男，四川达州人。本科与硕士毕业于石河子大学（财务管理专业），目前为上海财经大学会计学专业博士研究生（将于2021年6月毕业）。主要研究兴趣为审计、信息披露与大数据时代的财务会计研究。已在《经济研究》《管理世界》《会计研究》《China Economic Review》《China Journal of Accounting Studies》等国内外权威学术期刊发表论文多篇。先后主持新疆维吾尔自治区研究生科研创新项目1项、上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目1项、上海财经大学会计学院与大华会计师事务所共建联合研究项目1项。作为主要成员参与省部级以上课题4项。曾获得大学生国家奖学金、国家励志奖学金、研究生国家奖学金、全国大学生春节“钱”主题征文全国三等奖、新疆第八届研究生学术论坛三等奖、新疆第七届研究生学术论坛优秀奖、新疆维吾尔自治区优秀毕业论文、上海市“应用微观计量经济学”暑期学校优秀论文奖、徐政旦奖学金、优秀学生、优秀党员等荣誉。 报告简介 The recent ground-breaking reforms of auditing standards require auditors to disclose critical audit matters (CAM), which greatly enhance the informativeness and flexibility of audit report. This study investigates whether managers will utilize that flexibility to convey private information to investors, and whether auditors will certify that information. Based on a sample of CAMs disclosed by listed firms on China stock markets, we find that for firms with severe financial constraint and scarce analyst coverage, auditors tend to disclose more CAMs and audit responses in audit reports, and auditors are more likely to provide confirmative comments. Further analyses find that firms with confirmative CAMs have lower cost of capital, positive short-term market reaction, higher value relevance and ERC, and higher long-term market valuation. With regards to incentives of firms, we find that the communicating effect of CAMs primarily exists in firms with private owners, headquartered in regions with poor financial development, and with higher level of information uncertainty and financial risk. The certifying effect is more pronounced for firms located in regions with poor financial development, with higher level of information uncertainty and growth potential. With regards to incentives of auditors, we find that auditors tend to charge higher audit fees when helping firms to convey information, are less likely to certify the CAMs when firms engage in more earnings management, and the client importance has no impact on the disclosure of CAMs. Such results indicate that auditors take litigation risk and reputation penalty into consideration when helping firms to communicate and certify private information. The content analysis finds that for firms with severe financial constraint and scarce analyst coverage, the CAMs tend to be more readable, more positive and less boilerplate. Overall, the empirical results demonstrate that CAMs can help to communicate and certify private information of certain firms.